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A CALL TO CLARIFY THE “SCOPE OF
AUTHORITY”
QUESTION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
PAT FACKRELL*
ABSTRACT
It is no secret the doctrine of qualified immunity is under immense scrutiny.
Distinguished jurists and scholars at all levels have criticized the doctrine of qualified
immunity, some calling for it to be reconsidered or overruled entirely.
Amidst this scrutiny lies uncertainty in the doctrine’s application. Specifically, the
federal courts of appeal are split three ways on the question of whether an official
exceeding the official’s scope of authority under state law at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation can successfully assert qualified immunity. Some courts of
appeal do not require the official to demonstrate he acted within the scope of his
authority. Other courts of appeal require the official to identify state law affirmatively
authorizing, and narrowly tailored to, his discrete acts. Still other courts of appeal hold
that the official must demonstrate he acted within the clearly established scope of his
authority.
This Article suggests that the third approach requiring the official to demonstrate
he acted within the clearly established scope of his authority—should be adopted.
Adopting this approach would bring clarity and equilibrium to the doctrine of qualified
immunity at a critical time, while also leaving the important doctrine in place. And, of
all three approaches, the third approach best comports with the tradition of immunity,
most closely aligns with the history and purpose of key civil rights laws, and presents
the most workable rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Many in the civil rights bar can likely recite § 1983’s key language from memory:
“Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .
. . .”1 Congress did not equivocate when it codified these words as federal law. 2 But
liability under § 1983 is not as absolute as § 1983’s plain language may suggest.
The doctrine of qualified immunity signifies one major exception to § 1983’s
otherwise broad terms.3 Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that a
government official may assert when sued for money damages in the official’s
personal capacity under § 1983.4 While classified as an affirmative defense, qualified

1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019) (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (noting “the broad terms of § 1983”);
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (same); see also infra Part IV.A.2.
2

3 See, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, FED. JUD. CTR., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 143 (Kris
Markrian ed., 3d ed. 2014) (“Qualified immunity may well be the most important issue in §
1983 litigation. It is certainly the most important defense, and is frequently asserted as a defense
to § 1983 personal-capacity claims for damages.”). It should be noted that, while qualified
immunity often arises with respect to claims against state officials under § 1983, qualified
immunity also arises with respect to claims against federal officials under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 504 (1978) (“[W]e deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law
between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the
Constitution against federal officials.”). Under § 1983 and Bivens, the “qualified immunity
analysis is identical.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
4 E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). Qualified immunity does not apply to suits
against an official in the official’s official capacity. See, e.g., Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
472–73 (1985). Whereas a personal-capacity suit seeks to impose personal liability on the
official, an official-capacity suit does not seek to impose personal liability on the official and is
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immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”5 and thus
challenges whether the particular official can even be subjected to the litigation
process. Consequently, when qualified immunity is asserted, “the trial court must
exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity
defense” and ensures “that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome
discovery or trial proceedings.”6 Given its consequences, qualified immunity has long
been the subject of scrutiny, especially in recent years. 7
The Supreme Court has made it clear that, when qualified immunity is asserted, a
plaintiff must allege or show that the official “violated a statutory or constitutional
right”8 and must further allege or show that the right at issue was “clearly established”
at the time of the violation.9 Left unresolved, however, is whether an official who was
acting outside the official’s scope of authority under state law at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation is entitled to qualified immunity.10 Phrased otherwise, does
qualified immunity apply only to officials acting within the scope of their authority
under state law at the time in question?
In response to this question, the federal courts of appeal employ three primary
approaches. One approach does not require the official to demonstrate he was acting
within the scope of his authority.11 A second approach requires the official to identify
state law affirmatively authorizing, and narrowly tailored to, his discrete acts. 12 A third
approach holds that the official must demonstrate he acted within the clearly
established scope of his authority.13
This Article suggests that the third approach—requiring the official to demonstrate
he acted within the clearly established scope of his authority—should be adopted
because it comports with the tradition of immunity, aligns with the history and purpose
instead, “in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity [of which the
officer is an agent].” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985).
5

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

6

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1998).

7

See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (urging the Court to “reconsider [the] qualified immunity jurisprudence”);
Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1798
(2018) (contending that the doctrine of qualified immunity should be overruled).
8

Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663–64 (2012); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735
(2011).
9

Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663–64; Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.

E.g., Stanley v. Gallegos, 852 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (“One recurring issue has
been how to apply this doctrine when a state employee was apparently acting outside of his or
her authority under state law.”).
10

11

See, e.g., Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1243 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984)), cert. denied sub nom. Cummings v. Bussey, No. 18-1357,
2019 WL 4921308 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); see also infra Part III.A.
12 See, e.g., Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019); see also infra Part III.B.
13

See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 594 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v.
Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998); see also infra Part III.C.
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of § 1983, and presents the most workable rule. For essential context, Part II of this
Article discusses qualified immunity’s background and origins, as well as relevant
analytical refinements. Part III then explores the circuit split surrounding the scope of
authority question. Part IV turns to address the impact of the tradition of immunity, as
well as the history and purpose of § 1983, on the scope of authority question. Part V
recommends that qualified immunity be accorded only to officials who can
demonstrate they acted within the clearly established scope of their authority and
provides an analytical framework. Finally, Part VI concludes.
II. ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Although qualified immunity is under scrutiny and has been called into question
by many jurists and scholars,14 qualified immunity remains a key, and often
dispositive,15 doctrine in constitutional litigation. Qualified immunity is not explicitly
rooted in the Constitution or in a federal statute. 16 It is instead “a product of judicial
invention”17 that derives from “tradition[s] of immunity”18 at common law. As the
Supreme Court has summarized the doctrine, qualified immunity provides “ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.”19 Set forth below is a discussion of qualified immunity’s background and
origins, as well as the doctrine’s analytical refinements.
A. Background and Origins
In 1967, the Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of qualified immunity in
response to a surge of constitutional litigation filed during the civil rights era.20 As the
Court then instructed, police officers may assert “good faith and probable cause” as a
qualified immunity defense in response to a claim alleging unconstitutional arrest
under § 1983.21 The Court, however, did not define the substantive requirements or

14

See supra note 7.

Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) (“[I]f it is found applicable at any stage of
the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from
damages liability.”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 143.
15

16 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
17

Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for
Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 906 (1984) [hereinafter
Harlow’s New Standard].
18 Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980). See also Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1870
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that official immunity is
“available under [§ 1983] if it was ‘historically accorded the relevant official’ in an analogous
situation ‘at common law’” (quoting Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984))).
19

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

20 Harlow’s New Standard, supra note 17, at 906; Paul Howard Morris, The Impact of
Constitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52
VAND. L. REV. 489, 504 (1999).
21

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
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contours of qualified immunity at that time.22 The Court began to provide that
guidance in 1974, when it confronted claims alleging deprivation of due process under
§ 1983 stemming from the deaths of students who participated in anti-war
demonstrations at Kent State University.23 There, the Court explained that “[i]t is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.”24
The next year, 1975, the Court shed further light on qualified immunity by holding
that an official was not entitled to qualified immunity unless the official acted in both
objective and subjective good faith.25 Although the objective and subjective good faith
approach engendered immediate criticism,26 the Court adhered to the objective and
subjective good faith approach until 1982,27 when it jettisoned the subjective good
faith requirement in the seminal case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald.28
Harlow arose after Plaintiff A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management
analyst and was barred from future re-employment with the Department of the Air
Force.29 Fitzgerald alleged he was discharged and barred from re-employment in
retaliation for providing truthful testimony before Congress in violation of the First
Amendment.30 The substance of Fitzgerald’s testimony indicated that the country had
sustained cost overruns of over two billion dollars on certain military aircraft and that

22 See, e.g., id. at 557–58 (remanding for new trial to determine whether, inter alia, officers
“reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional”); Harlow’s New Standard,
supra note 17, at 907.
23

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 234–35 (1974), abrogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982).
24

Id. at 247–48.

25

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975), abrogated by Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18.

26

See, e.g., id. at 327–28 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that officials “will now act at the peril of some judge or jury subsequently finding that a goodfaith belief as to the applicable law was mistaken and hence actionable.”).
See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (“The applicable test focuses not only on
whether the official has an objectively reasonable basis for that belief, but also on whether ‘[t]he
official himself [is] acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right’” (quoting Wood,
420 U.S. at 321)), abrogated by Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
507 (1978) (explaining officials may not “with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is
known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they should know
transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule”), abrogated by Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–
18; Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 564–66 (1978) (concluding that prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity because they acted in objective and subjective good faith in case
involving alleged interference with prisoner’s mail), abrogated by Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18.
27

28 457 U.S. 800 (1982). On the same day the Court decided Harlow, the Court decided Nixon
v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). Harlow and Nixon arose from the same operative set of
facts, although the cases concerned different legal issues. Harlow concerned immunity of White
House aides and Nixon concerned immunity of the President.
29

Nixon, 457 U.S. at 739–40.

30

Id. at 735–40.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

5

6

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

“unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.”31
Fitzgerald further alleged both Alexander Butterfield and Bryce Harlow, as White
House aides to former President Richard Nixon, had conspired to bring about the
termination of Fitzgerald’s employment.32 Fitzgerald eventually filed a lawsuit for
money damages in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against
several defendants, including President Nixon, Butterfield, and Harlow. 33 Butterfield
and Harlow moved for summary judgment on the basis of immunity. 34 The district
court denied the motion for summary judgment.35 Butterfield and Harlow appealed the
district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment based on immunity. 36
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, and the
Supreme Court granted Butterfield and Harlow’s petition for a writ of certiorari on the
issue of immunity.37
The Harlow Court, with Justice Powell writing for the majority, addressed “the
scope of the immunity available to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official acts.” 38 The Court began
its analysis by noting that its decisions “consistently have held that government
officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.”39 The Court
recognized that “public officers require this protection to shield them from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability” 40 so
as to foster the “vigorous exercise of official authority.”41
Harlow recognized two kinds of immunity: “absolute” and “qualified.”42 Whether
immunity is deemed absolute or qualified turns on the nature of the official’s duties. 43
If the official demonstrates his duties “embrace[] a function so sensitive as to require
a total shield from liability” and further demonstrates “he was discharging the
protected function when performing the act for which liability is asserted,” absolute
immunity will apply.44 In rejecting Butterfield and Harlow’s contention for absolute
immunity, the Court explained that absolute immunity is limited to specific “judicial,
31

Id. at 734, 736–38.

32

Id. at 733–34.

33

Id. at 739–40.

34

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).

35

Id. at 805.

36

Id. at 806.

37

Id. The Author notes that, unlike many other types of interlocutory rulings, an interlocutory
ruling denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable so long as the appeal can be
decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 160.
38

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.

39

Id. at 806 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)).

40

Id. at 807.

41

Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)).

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 813.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss1/5

6

2019]

A CALL TO CLARIFY THE “SCOPE OF AUTHORITY”

7

prosecutorial, and legislative functions.”45 Based on the record before the Court, the
Court concluded that Butterfield and Harlow failed to demonstrate their duties as
White House aides warranted absolute immunity.46
The Court then turned to qualified immunity. Harlow reasoned that qualified
immunity, as opposed to absolute immunity, “represents the norm” for most executive
officers.47 Qualified immunity is appropriate because it strikes a balance between
“competing values.”48 These competing values are “the importance of a damages
remedy to protect the rights of citizens”49 and “the need to protect officials who are
required to exercise discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the
vigorous exercise of official authority.”50 The Court emphasized that requiring
officials to defend lawsuits is attended by the governmental and social costs of the
“expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, . .
. the deterrence of able citizens from accepting of public office,” 51 and “the danger
that the fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible . . . , in the discharge of their duties.’” 52 Harlow concluded that
qualified immunity is the “best attainable accommodation between these competing
values.”53
Establishing the controlling doctrine of qualified immunity, the Court jettisoned
the previously required inquiry into whether the official acted in subjective good
faith.54 The Court explained it was
clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of
government officials. Not only are there the general costs of subjecting
officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from
public service. There are special costs to “subjective” inquiries of this kind.
Immunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary
functions. In contrast with the thought processes accompanying “ministerial”
tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are
influenced by the decisionmaker’s experiences, values, and emotions. These
variables explain in part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be
decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in which
there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence. Judicial inquiry into
subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the
deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional
45

Id. at 811.

46

Id. at 808–13.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504–05 (1978)).

50

Id. (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 506).

51

Id. at 814.

52

Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).

53

Id.

54

Id. at 815.
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colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.55
Having eliminated the subjective good faith requirement, the Court emphasized
that qualified immunity is a standard of objective reasonableness. 56 This standard of
objective reasonableness is “measured by reference to clearly established law.” 57
When the law is clearly established, the defense of qualified immunity “ordinarily
should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law
governing his conduct.”58 As the Court further explained, “[w]here an official could
be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional
rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such
conduct may have a cause of action.”59 With that guidance, the Court remanded the
case for the factual determination of whether Fitzgerald could overcome Butterfield
and Harlow’s assertion of qualified immunity.60
Thus, while Harlow broadened the doctrine of qualified immunity in deference to
the important policy concerns that are triggered when officials are sued, the Court
clarified that its holding “provide[s] no license to lawless conduct.”61
B. Analytical Refinements
The key holding of Harlow still controls.62 As the Court continues to explain,
“[w]hether qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the ‘objective legal
reasonableness’ of the official’s acts.” 63 This “objective legal reasonableness”
standard means that officials are immune from suits for “civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.”64 Although this standard necessarily requires
inquiry into both whether the official violated a right and whether that right was clearly
established at the relevant time, the Court in Harlow did not address whether these
inquiries should or must be resolved in a particular order. That guidance came in the
2001 decision of Saucier v. Katz,65 where the Court held that the sequence of the
analysis must be, first, whether a statutory or constitutional right was violated, and if
so, second, whether that right was clearly established at the relevant time.66 Saucier’s

55

Id. at 816–17 (internal citations omitted).

56

Id. at 818.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 818–19.

59

Id. at 819.

60

Id. at 820.

61

Id.

62

See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).

63

Id. (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).

64

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).

65

533 U.S. 194 (2001).

66

Id. at 200.
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mandatory sequence of analysis generated criticism67 and was overruled in 2009, when
the Court decided Pearson v. Callahan.68
In Pearson, law enforcement in Utah received a tip that Afton Callahan was
dealing methamphetamine from his trailer home. 69 Law enforcement thus arranged a
sting operation with the tipster, Brian Bartholomew.70 During the sting, Callahan sold
Bartholomew one gram of methamphetamine for $100.71 Bartholomew then “gave the
arrest signal” to law enforcement.72 Law enforcement entered Callahan’s enclosed
porch, which Callahan and Bartholomew occupied, observed Callahan drop a plastic
bag filled with methamphetamine, and conducted a protective sweep of the premises. 73
Law enforcement seized methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia during the
protective sweep before arresting Callahan.74 Neither the protective sweep nor the
arrest was authorized by a warrant.75 After being charged with possession and
distribution of methamphetamine, Callahan challenged the warrantless protective
sweep and arrest.76 A Utah trial court concluded that exigent circumstances justified
the warrantless protective sweep and arrest, but the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed
and vacated Callahan’s conviction.77
Callahan then filed a civil rights lawsuit against the law enforcement officers in
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking money damages and
alleging a Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983.78 When the officers moved for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court assumed, without
deciding, that the officers violated Callahan’s Fourth Amendment rights but held that
Callahan failed to show the violation was of a clearly established right.79 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.80 It held that the officers had violated Callahan’s
Fourth Amendment rights and that the relevant Fourth Amendment right—“the right
67 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 431 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that “the rule of Saucier has generated considerable criticism from
both commentators and judges”).
68

555 U.S. at 236.

69

Id. at 227.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 228.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 228–29.

79

Callahan v. Millard Cty., No. 2:04-CV-00952, 2006 WL 1409130, at *9 (D. Utah May 18,
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Pearson, 555
U.S. at 223.
Callahan v. Millard Cty., 494 F.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Pearson, 555
U.S. at 223.
80
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to be free in one’s home from unreasonable searches and arrests”—was clearly
established at the time of the violation.81
The Supreme Court granted the officers’ petition for a writ of certiorari and
“directed the parties to address whether Saucier should be overruled.”82 In a
unanimous decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court first summarized the policies
underlying qualified immunity that had been fully explored in Harlow.83 The Court
then turned to Saucier’s “rigid order of battle”84 analysis, noting that the Saucier
analysis “has been criticized by Members of this Court and by lower court judges, who
have been required to apply the procedure in a great variety of cases and thus have
much firsthand experience bearing on its advantages and disadvantages.”85 As the
Court elaborated, the “rigid Saucier procedure comes with a price. The procedure
sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult
questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case.” 86 This expenditure of
resources, the Court explained, undermines the aim to expeditiously resolve questions
of qualified immunity by forcing parties to litigate issues that may ultimately not be
germane to the case’s resolution.87 The Court further discussed how Saucier’s
drawbacks implicate concerns of analytical efficiency, constitutional avoidance, and
establishing sound precedent in the lower courts.88 Given the drawbacks of Saucier,
the Court in Pearson vested lower courts with discretion to “to determine the order of
decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each
case.”89 Applying that principle to the facts of Pearson, the Court held that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established
law, regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred. 90 The Court therefore
reversed the Tenth Circuit’s judgment.91
As such, Pearson signifies the Court’s effort to streamline the application of
qualified immunity by fashioning the doctrine into a flexible, workable analysis
intended to be efficiently applied on a case-by-case basis.

81

Id. at 897–98.

82

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

83

Id.; see supra Part II.A.

84

Id. at 234.

85

Id. at 231.

86

Id. at 236–37.

87

Id. at 237.

88

Id. at 237–38.

at 242. In deciding “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should
be addressed first,” courts may consider: (1) the “conservation of judicial resources”; (2) the
“development of constitutional precedent”; (3) how to best provide meaningful “guidance for
future cases”; and (4) whether the briefing on constitutional questions is “woefully inadequate.”
Id. at 236–39.
89Id.

90

Id. at 231–32, 242.

91

Id. at 242.
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III. THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY QUESTION
The Supreme Court undoubtedly brought a degree of clarity and efficiency to
qualified immunity when establishing the controlling doctrine in Harlow and further
refining the analysis in Pearson. While the Court has “never suggested that . . . any . .
. official has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an
official capacity,”92 the Court has not yet resolved whether an official acting outside
the official’s scope of authority under state law at the time of the alleged constitutional
violation is entitled to qualified immunity. Absent controlling precedent, the federal
courts of appeal disagree on this question.
At one end of the spectrum, one approach does not require the official to
demonstrate he was acting within the scope of his authority at the time in question.93
At the other end of the spectrum, a second approach requires the official to identify
state law affirmatively authorizing, and narrowly tailored to, his discrete acts. 94 At the
middle of the spectrum, a third approach holds that the official must demonstrate he
acted within the clearly established scope of his authority. 95 Each approach is
discussed in turn.96
A. Authority Irrelevant Approach
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits do not require the official to demonstrate he acted
within the scope of his authority under state law to be entitled to qualified immunity
(the Authority Irrelevant Approach).97 The case best illustrating the Authority
Irrelevant Approach is the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Cummings v. Dean.98 In Dean,
a class of plaintiffs who worked on public-works projects in New Mexico alleged they
were undercompensated from 2013 to 2016.99 The plaintiffs alleged their injury was
traceable to the Director of the Labor Relations Division of New Mexico’s Workforce

92

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997).

93

See, e.g., Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1243 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Cummings v. Bussey, No. 18-1357, 2019 WL 4921308 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); see also infra Part
III.A.
94

See, e.g., Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019); see also infra Part III.B.
95 See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 594 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v.
Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998); see also infra Part III.C.
96 At least two other circuits have noted that an official’s authority may be relevant to qualified
immunity, but these circuits have not conclusively aligned with any of the three primary
approaches discussed in this Article. See Collins v. Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d 474, 476 (1st
Cir. 1990) (referring to an official’s scope of authority as a “further gloss” on the doctrine of
qualified immunity); Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1985) (“It does seem
reasonable . . . to require that a lower level public official . . . demonstrate that, based on
objective circumstances at the time he acted, his actions were undertaken pursuant to the
performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.”).
97 See, e.g., Cummings, 913 F.3d at 1243; Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th
Cir. 1986).
98

913 F.3d at 1227.

99

Id. at 1231.
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Solutions, Jason Dean.100 As the plaintiffs specifically alleged, Director Dean had
failed to determine and publish the rates of minimum wages and fringe benefits for
laborers on public-works projects as required under New Mexico’s Public Works
Minimum Wage Act, as amended in 2009 (the Wage Act).101 The Wage Act required
Director Dean to determine and publish the rates of minimum wages and fringe
benefits “based on the wage rates and fringe-benefit rates used in collective bargaining
agreements . . . , as opposed to the earlier version of the [Wage Act’s] mandate to
simply collect data for the ‘purpose of obtaining sufficient information upon which to
make [a] determination of wage rates.’”102
But by 2011, Director Dean had failed to determine and publish the rates required
under the Wage Act.103 Unions representing public workers thus filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus104 in New Mexico’s Supreme Court.105 In June 2011, New Mexico’s
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the mandamus petition, where representations
on behalf of Director Dean were made in open court that rates would be determined
and published “in four or five months.”106 Based in part on those representations, New
Mexico’s Supreme Court denied the mandamus petition. 107 Yet, even by 2015,
Director Dean had still failed to determine and publish the rates required under the
Wage Act.108 As such, the unions filed a successive petition for a writ of mandamus
in New Mexico’s Supreme Court.109 On June 15, 2015, New Mexico’s Supreme Court
granted the mandamus petition and explained as follows:
We hold that under the [Wage] Act [Director Dean] has a mandatory,
nondiscretionary duty to set the . . . rates . . . and that [Director Dean’s] failure
to do so violates the [Wage] Act. We therefore issue a writ of mandamus
ordering [Director Dean] to comply with the [Wage] Act and set rates . . . as

100

Id.

101

Id. at 1231–32.

102

Id. at 1232 (quoting N.M. Stat. § 13-4-11(B)) (2009).

103

Id.

104

Under New Mexico law:

Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial act or duty that is clear and
indisputable. A ministerial act is an act which an officer performs under a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.
N.M. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Dean, 353 P.3d 1212, 1215 (N.M. 2015) (quoting
New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 290 (N.M. 2011)).
105 Dean, 913 F.3d at 1232–33 (citing N.M. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 353 P.3d at
1214).
106

N.M. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 353 P.3d at 1214.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1212, 1214.

109

Id. at 1214.
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required under the [Wage] Act within thirty days of the issuance of this
opinion.110
In August 2016, the Dean plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Director Dean in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking money damages
and alleging due process violations under § 1983.111 Director Dean filed a motion to
dismiss based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied after concluding
that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a violation of their clearly established rights
to due process.112 In part, the district court reasoned that the plaintiffs had a protected
property interest in the rates required under the Wage Act, which “clearly and
unambiguously” required Director Dean’s compliance.113 Director Dean appealed that
decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.114
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Director Dean was
entitled to qualified immunity without inquiring into Director’s Dean’s authority
under New Mexico law.115 The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by addressing the
plaintiffs’ contention that qualified immunity was “unavailable because Director
Dean’s obligation to set . . . rates was a ministerial duty, rather than a discretionary
function of his position.”116 The Tenth Circuit rejected that contention.117 To be sure,
the Tenth Circuit in Dean acknowledged that “there was no confusion” regarding
Director Dean’s obligation to determine and publish the rates required under the Wage
Act.118 Even so, Dean applied “a federal standard to determine whether Director
Dean’s obligations were sufficiently discretionary” and concluded that Director Dean
exercised “a substantial measure of discretion” in deciding how to implement the
Wage Act.119
The Tenth Circuit in Dean then addressed the requirement of qualified immunity
it concluded was dispositive, namely whether the plaintiffs could establish any right
allegedly violated was clearly established.120 As to that question, the Tenth Circuit
explained that the district court erroneously “equate[d] a violation of a clear obligation

110

Id.

111 Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Cummings v. Bussey, No. 18-1357, 2019 WL 4921308 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
112

Cummings v. Bussey, No. 16 CV 951 JAP/KK, 2017 WL 2332636, at *7 (D.N.M. Apr.
20, 2017), rev’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227
(10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Cummings v. Bussey, No. 18-1357, 2019 WL 4921308
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
113

Id. at *8.

114

Dean, 913 F.3d at 1234.

115

Id. at 1241–45.

116

Id. at 1241.

117

Id. at 1242.

118

Id. at 1243 n.4.

119

Id. at 1242.

120

Id.
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under state law with a violation of clearly-established federal law.”121 The Tenth
Circuit elaborated that “[w]hether Director Dean violated clearly-established state law
. . . is an entirely separate question from whether [he] violated clearly-established
federal law.”122 Because the plaintiffs “offered no authority clearly establishing that
Director Dean violated their . . . rights under federal law,” the Tenth Circuit held that
Director Dean was entitled to qualified immunity.123
As demonstrated by Dean, under the Authority Irrelevant Approach, an official
need not demonstrate he acted within the scope of his authority under state law to be
entitled to qualified immunity.124 By not inquiring into the official’s scope of
authority, the Authority Irrelevant Approach permits the official to claim qualified
immunity even if the official lacked authority.125 Indeed, Dean shows that the official
may be entitled to qualified immunity even if the conduct in question arises from the
official’s derogation of clear, statutorily-mandated duties, as determined by the state’s
highest court.126
B. Specific Acts Approach
In contrast to the Authority Irrelevant Approach, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits hold that an official who asserts qualified immunity must identify state law
affirmatively authorizing, and narrowly tailored to, his discrete acts (the Specific Acts
Approach).127 The case best illustrating the Specific Acts Approach is the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Estate of Cummings v. Davenport.128 Davenport arose after
Marquette Cummings, an inmate at an Alabama prison, was stabbed in the eye with a
shank by another inmate.129 Cummings was airlifted to a hospital in Birmingham,
Alabama, where he was diagnosed to be in critical condition.130 Hospital staff
informed Cummings’s mother, Angela Gaines, that the Prison Warden, Carter
Davenport, had instructed the hospital to “stop giving Cummings medication and to

121

Id. at 1243.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 1245.

124 Id.; see also Stanley v. Gallegos, 852 F.3d 1210, 1224 (10th Cir. 2017) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (“[O]fficials do not ‘forfeit their immunity’ defense simply because they are shown
to have acted outside the scope of their authority under state law.”); Gagne v. City of Galveston,
805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that “allegations about the breach of a statute or
regulation are simply irrelevant to the question of an official’s eligibility for qualified immunity
in a suit over the deprivation of a constitutional right,” even if those allegations concern
fundamental responsibilities of the official).
125

Dean, 913 F.3d at 1241–45.

126

Id. at 1241.

127

See, e.g., Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019); Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 80 (2d Cir. 2005); Gravely
v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1998).
128

906 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019).

129

Id. at 937.

130

Id.
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disconnect the life support machine.”131 Gaines attempted to intervene in an effort to
keep Cummings on medication and life support.132 But hospital staff told Gaines that
Warden Davenport’s instruction governed, explaining that Cummings was under the
legal custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections.133 As such, the hospital
complied with Warden Davenport’s instruction.134 Cummings died one day after he
was stabbed.135
After Cummings’s death, his estate and Gaines filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging several claims against
several defendants, including claims for money damages against Warden Davenport
under § 1983.136 Warden Davenport responded to the lawsuit by filing a motion to
dismiss based on qualified immunity.137 The district court denied his motion to
dismiss, concluding that Warden Davenport had failed to demonstrate his acts—
entering a do-not-resuscitate order and deciding to remove Cummings from artificial
life support—were within the scope of his authority under Alabama law.138 Warden
Davenport appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.139
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. 140 The Eleventh Circuit first
clarified that Warden Davenport had “the initial burden of raising the defense of
qualified immunity by proving that his discretionary authority extended to his alleged
actions.”141 The Eleventh Circuit referred to qualified immunity as a “formidable
shield” and emphasized that “[i]f, and only if, the defendant [meets his initial burden]
will the burden shift to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant violated clearly
established law.”142 The official’s threshold burden, as the Eleventh Circuit explained,
turns on whether the official can show his actions “were (1) undertaken pursuant to
the performance of his duties, and (2) within the scope of his authority.” 143
The Eleventh Circuit turned to Alabama state law to ascertain the scope of Warden
Davenport’s authority.144 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Alabama caselaw
131

Id. at 937–38.

132

Id. at 938.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.; Cummings v. Davenport, No. 2:15-CV-02274-JEO, 2017 WL 3242783, at *7–8 (N.D.
Ala. July 31, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934 (11th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019).
139

Davenport, 906 F.3d at 937.

140

Id. at 941–43.

141

Id. at 939.

142

Id. at 940.

143

Id. (quoting Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998)).

144

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

15

16

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

holding that “an inmate is the custody of the warden” and that “decision-making
related to the provision of medical care for inmates . . . [falls] soundly within [the
warden’s] discretion.”145 Those broad principles, although “firmly established,” were
not sufficiently specific so as to “compel” the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that
Alabama law affirmatively authorized Warden Davenport’s discrete acts. 146
The state law the Eleventh Circuit deemed controlling in Davenport was the
Alabama Natural Death Act (ANDA).147 Under ANDA, the Alabama Legislature
established “a comprehensive legislative scheme for end-of-life medical decisions,
including the decisions to enter a do-not-resuscitate order . . . and to withdraw artificial
life support.”148 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed ANDA’s comprehensive legislative
scheme and, after applying the expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation,149
concluded that nothing under ANDA affirmatively “empowered” Warden Davenport
to enter a do-not-resuscitate order or remove Cummings from artificial life support. 150
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned as follows:
[ANDA] specifies, in order of priority, who may make end-of-life decisions
on behalf of a permanently incapacitated patient, and a prison warden is
nowhere on the list.
It is a familiar canon that “[t]he expression of one thing implies the
exclusion of others.” And [ANDA’s] list of potential surrogates includes not
just “one thing,” but a range of specific possibilities that include a courtappointed guardian, any member of the patient’s family, and a medical
committee. The conclusion that “the expression of” all of these possible
surrogates “implies the exclusion of others”—including a prison warden—is
inescapable.151
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit in Davenport applied the expressio unius canon
without first declaring ANDA ambiguous. In other cases, the Eleventh Circuit has
instructed that, “[b]efore turning to a canon of statutory interpretation, we must find
some level of ambiguity in the words of the statute.”152 Although ANDA was not
145

Id. at 941 (first quoting Ex parte Rogers, 82 So. 785, 785 (Ala. Ct. App. 1919); then quoting
Edwards v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2000)).
146

Id.

147

Id. at 941 (citing Ala. Code § 22-8A-1 et seq.).

148

Id.

Expressio unius supplies a negative inference, reasoning that Congress’s inclusion of one
item is the implied exclusion of that which is absent. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16–17 (2008).
But if the items Congress included are deemed “exemplary, not exclusive,” NationsBank of
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1995), expressio unius
does not apply. Whether expressio unius is applicable thus depends on the context. See id.
149

150

Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 941 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 2746 (2019).
151

Id. at 942 (citations omitted).

152

Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.30 (11th Cir. 2005). Although
Davenport did not explicitly purport to apply the statutory interpretation rules of Alabama state
courts when interpreting ANDA, the Eleventh Circuit in other cases has explained that, in
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declared ambiguous, the application of expressio unius rendered ANDA “fatal . . . to
qualified immunity.”153 Because Warden Davenport failed to identify specific,
narrowly-tailored law—whether under ANDA or otherwise—affirmatively
authorizing his discrete acts, the Eleventh Circuit held that Warden Davenport failed
to demonstrate he was acting within the scope of his authority at the time in
question.154 The Eleventh Circuit therefore did not reach the remaining requirements
of qualified immunity—i.e., whether Cummings’s estate and Gaines could
demonstrate that Warden Davenport violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the violation.155 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Warden Davenport’s motion to dismiss
based on qualified immunity.156
As demonstrated by Davenport, under the Specific Acts Approach, an official who
asserts qualified immunity must identify state law affirmatively authorizing his
discrete acts, and doubts are likely to be resolved against the official. 157 The official
may not rely on established, general principles that merely govern his duties as a whole
but must instead point to authority narrowly tailored to his discrete acts, even if that
authority is ancillary to the established principles governing his duties as a whole.158
If the official makes that threshold showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to

“render[ing] a decision based on interpretation of a state statute, we must decide the case as the
state’s highest court would.” Fatt Katt Enters., Inc. v. Rigsby Constr. Inc., No. 18-11182, 2019
WL 972043, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019). Even if Davenport had looked to the statutory
interpretation rules of Alabama state courts, the rules employed by those courts suggest a statute
must be declared ambiguous before canons of statutory interpretation will be used. See Ex parte
Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 218, 224 (Ala. 2004) (“This ambiguity in the statutory
language justifies the use of other canons of statutory construction (beyond the ‘plain-meaning
rule’).”).
153

Davenport, 906 F.3d at 941.

154

Id. at 942.

155

Id.

156

Id. at 941–43.

Id. at 940–43; see also Sell v. City of Columbus, 47 F. App’x 685, 693 (6th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting city code provisions, concluding that code enforcement officials failed to
demonstrate they were authorized to order an emergency eviction under those provisions, and
remanding for “further factual development”); Shechter v. Comptroller of N.Y., 79 F.3d 265,
270 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that attorneys failed to demonstrate they were acting within the
scope of their authority when providing legal advice to pro se litigant based on attorneys’ “bald
assertion” of authority); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
guardian failed to demonstrate she was acting within the scope of her authority in “directly
providing comfort” when nothing under the applicable state law “require[d] a guardian to care
directly for the child”). But cf. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 80 (2d Cir. 2005)
(concluding that officials were acting within the scope of their authority when serving trespass
notices because that issue was undisputed); Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 347–48 (6th Cir.
1998) (concluding that correction officer sufficiently demonstrated he was acting within the
scope of his authority when capturing an escaped inmate because state statutes and regulations
“clearly contemplated the involvement of corrections officers in the apprehension of escaped
inmates”).
157

158

Davenport, 906 F.3d at 941–42.
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demonstrate the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at
the time of the violation.159
C. Clear Scope Approach
In between the Authority Irrelevant Approach and the Specific Acts Approach, the
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that an official asserting qualified immunity
must demonstrate he acted within the clearly established scope of his authority under
state law (the Clear Scope Approach).160 The case best illustrating the Clear Scope
Approach is the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re Allen.161 In re Allen involved a
dispute between West Virginia’s Attorney General, Darrell McGraw (who had
previously served on West Virginia’s Supreme Court), and the Better Government
Bureau Inc. (BGB), a government watchdog association.162
The dispute arose when Attorney General McGraw denied BGB’s request for
information under West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act. 163 BGB’s information
request concerned a complaint from Suarez Corporation Industries (SCI), which was
one of BGB’s most “active members and its largest source of membership dues.”164
SCI’s complaint alleged that Attorney General McGraw’s office had filed a lawsuit
against one of SCI’s subsidiaries that “raised questions about abuse of power.”165
Following the denial of BGB’s request for information, BGB publicly represented it
intended to open a West Virginia chapter to combat “crack politics.”166 Attorney
General McGraw, in response, sought to stymie BGB’s intended expansion into West
Virginia by making it impossible for BGB to incorporate in West Virginia. 167 To that
end, Attorney General McGraw used personal funds to incorporate “a Government
Agency Corporation” he named “Better Government Bureau.”168 Further, Attorney
General McGraw sent a letter to the attorneys general of the forty-nine other states,
urging them to “register the name of the Better Government Bureau” to thwart BGB’s
activities.169 Attorney General McGraw was ultimately effective in precluding BGB
from incorporating in West Virginia.170
BGB filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia against Attorney General McGraw, seeking money damages and
159

Id. at 940.

160 See, e.g., Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 236–37 (8th Cir. 2011); In re Allen, 106 F.3d
582, 594 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S.
1047 (1998); Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1372–73 (9th Cir. 1987).
161

106 F.3d at 582.

162

Id. at 587–88.

163

Id. at 587.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 587–88.

167

Id. at 588.

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Id.
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alleging First Amendment violations under § 1983.171 After the close of discovery,
BGB uncovered key information that had not been disclosed during discovery. 172
Specifically, a secretary of Attorney General McGraw, who was later fired, provided
BGB with letters in which Attorney General McGraw requested that West Virginia’s
Secretary of State “resist and refuse” BGB’s efforts to incorporate in West Virginia in
light of BGB’s activities of “fraud and deceit.”173 When Attorney General McGraw
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court
concluded that Attorney General McGraw had exceeded the scope of his authority and
denied the motion.174 Attorney General McGraw appealed that ruling to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis in In re Allen by noting that the question of
whether an official who exceeds the scope of his authority is entitled to qualified
immunity was one of “first impression in this court.”175 The Fourth Circuit examined
the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, observing that “it was well
recognized at common law that a government official who exceeded his authority
enjoyed no immunity, but rather was civilly liable for money damages.”176 Moreover,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the history and purpose of both § 1983 and qualified
immunity supported limiting the doctrine’s applicability to instances in which the
official acted within the scope of his authority.177 The Fourth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that an official may “claim qualified immunity as long as his actions are not
clearly established to be beyond the boundaries of his discretionary authority.” 178 In
re Allen further explained as follows:
This test is objective, and examines what a reasonable official in the
defendant’s position would have understood the limits of his statutory
authority to be.
***
[A]ll the official must know is the limit of his own authority. A government
official does not need an extensive background in legal history to understand
that he cannot claim qualified immunity when he acts totally beyond the
scope of his authority. Thus, we jeopardize no public policy goal by requiring
a government official to know the outer limits of his own authority and, in

171

Id. at 588–89.

172

Id. at 589.

173 Id. See also Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540, 553 n.17 (S.D.W.
Va. 1995), opinion reinstated, 924 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.W. Va. 1996), and aff’d sub nom. In re
Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better Gov’t Bureau,
Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
174

In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 590.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 592.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 593.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

19

20

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

turn, holding him responsible for actions clearly established to be outside
those limits.179
Having decided that an official may claim qualified immunity so long as he does
not exceed the clearly established scope of his authority, the Fourth Circuit turned to
provide a governing analytical framework.180 The threshold inquiry under In re Allen
is whether the official can show his acts “were not clearly established to be beyond
the scope of his authority.”181 Although the burden is placed on the official, the Fourth
Circuit clarified that “an official’s conduct falls within his authority unless a
reasonable official in the defendant’s position would have known that the conduct was
clearly established to be beyond the scope of that authority.”182 Ascertaining the
official’s scope of authority requires analysis of the operative “statutes or
regulations.”183 The analysis is not whether the official properly exercised his duties
or violated the law.184 The controlling question is instead whether “the act complained
of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to,” the
official’s scope of authority.185 In the event the official fails to meet this threshold
burden, qualified immunity must be denied regardless of whether the plaintiff can
demonstrate the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.186
Applying these principles to the facts of In re Allen, the Fourth Circuit first
clarified that the proper inquiry was whether Attorney General McGraw exceeded the
clearly established scope of his authority by forming “his own ‘government agency’
corporation” under the auspices of public office, not by allegedly retaliating against
BGB.187 The Fourth Circuit then surveyed West Virginia law to ascertain the scope of
Attorney General McGraw’s authority.188 The case defining Attorney General
McGraw’s authority under West Virginia law was Manchin v. Browning,189 which
Attorney General McGraw had himself authored while on West Virginia’s Supreme
Court approximately twelve years before the dispute with BGB arose.190 In Manchin,
West Virginia’s Supreme Court explained that “‘the powers and duties of the Attorney
General’ are limited to those ‘specified by the constitution and by rules of law

179

Id.

180

Id. at 594.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 595.

184

Id. at 594.

185

Id.

186

Id. at 594, 598.

187

Id. at 595.

188

Id. at 595–96.

189 See Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1982), overruled by Discover Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 2013).
190

In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 595–96 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better
Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
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prescribed pursuant thereto.’”191 Because Attorney General McGraw identified no
constitutional provision or other state law that authorized him to form a corporation,
much less a so-called government agency corporation,192 under the auspices of public
office, In re Allen concluded that Attorney General McGraw failed to show he acted
within the clearly established scope of his authority at the time in question. 193
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Attorney General McGraw’s
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.194
As demonstrated by In re Allen, under the Clear Scope Approach, the official must
demonstrate he acted within the clearly established scope of his authority under state
law as a threshold matter.195 The Clear Scope Approach holds that the official’s
conduct falls within the scope of his authority unless a reasonable official in the
official’s position would have known otherwise. 196 Only if the official satisfies his
threshold burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate the official
violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the
violation.197
IV. THE TRADITION OF IMMUNITY, HISTORY OF § 1983, AND PURPOSE OF § 1983
SHOW THAT THE CLEAR SCOPE APPROACH SHOULD GOVERN
The circuit split explored above raises two related questions. First, should qualified
immunity be limited to officials acting within the scope of their authority under state
law at the time in question? And if so, second, how should that determination be made?
The Supreme Court has provided an analytical framework that ultimately suggests an
answer to each question. Specifically, under a tradition, history, and purpose analysis,
the Court has

191

Id. at 595 (quoting Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 915).

192 Id. at 596–98. The Fourth Circuit noted that it was unable to locate any West Virginia law
recognizing a government agency corporation, reasoning that “the fact that [Attorney General
McGraw] created an entity heretofore unknown to West Virginia law, with personal funds no
less, further evidences that he wandered far beyond the limits of his authority.” Id. at 597 n.5.
193

Id. at 598.

194

Id.

195 Id. at 594; see also Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“Arguably, by entering into the curtilage and house despite the presence of ‘No Trespassing’
signs and a regulation’s explicit directive to leave, the tax assessor exceeded his discretionary
authority and therefore should not be entitled to qualified immunity.”); Johnson v. Phillips, 664
F.3d 232, 239 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that “auxiliary reserve police officer” was not entitled to
qualified immunity because officer exceeded the clearly established scope of his authority by
conducting a search incident to arrest when the governing law deprived officer of authority to
do so); Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that sheriff was
not entitled to qualified immunity for claim arising from threatening and pointing weapons at
his employees because “[n]o reasonable official in the sheriff’s shoes could have thought it
within his duties to threaten his employees with deadly force”); Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d
1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Because the [officers] knowingly acted outside the scope of their
authority, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.” (emphasis added)).
196

See supra note 195.

197

In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 594–98.
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accorded certain government officials either absolute or qualified immunity
from suit if the tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in the common
law . . . . Additionally, irrespective of the common law support, [the Court]
will not recognize an immunity available at common law if § 1983’s history
or purpose counsel against applying it in § 1983 actions.198
Set forth below is a discussion of the governing principles relevant to the tradition,
history, and purpose analysis. Then, the tradition, history, and purpose analysis is
applied to the Authority Irrelevant Approach, the Specific Acts Approach, and the
Clear Scope Approach.
A. Governing Principles
The governing principles relevant to the tradition of immunity, history of § 1983,
and purpose of § 1983 are discussed in turn.
1. Tradition of Immunity
The “tradition of immunity” inquiry is whether granting immunity to the particular
official may fairly be said to have been “so firmly rooted in the common law and . . .
supported by such strong policy reasons that Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.”199 The American common law, rather
than the English common law, is determinative of this inquiry. 200
The American common law is replete with precedent limiting official immunity to
acts within the scope of the official’s authority. In the 1804 decision of Little v.
Bareme,201 for instance, the Court explained that an official operating a war ship on
behalf of the United States could be “answerable in damages to any person injured”
by the official’s conduct when that conduct was not “strictly warranted by law.”202
There, President John Adams had ordered the official to seize a ship sailing from a
French port, but the relevant law only authorized the seizure of ships sailing to French
ports.203 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Little, held that the official
was liable for the seizure because President Adams’s order could not “legalize an act
which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.” 204 Similarly, in
the 1806 case of Wise v. Withers,205 an official attempted to collect militia fines from
198 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1992) (internal citations omitted). See also
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403–12 (1997) (applying tradition, history, and purpose
analysis to prison guard defendants working at private, for-profit prison); Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–78 (1993) (applying tradition, history, and purpose analysis to
prosecutor defendants); Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1980) (applying
tradition, history, and purpose analysis to municipality defendant).
199

Richardson, 521 U.S. at 403 (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164).

200 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
644 n.5 (1987)).
201

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).

202

Id. at 179.

203

Id. at 170–72.

204

Id. at 179.

205

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806).
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a justice of the peace, notwithstanding that the justice of the peace was exempt from
militia duty and the attendant fines.206 In an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Marshall, the Court held that the official had exceeded his authority and was therefore
liable for trespass.207
In the 1851 decision of Mitchell v. Harmony,208 which concerned a taking during
the Mexican and American War, the Court confronted the question of “under what
circumstances private property may be taken from the owner by a military officer in a
time of war.”209 Chief Justice Taney, writing for the Court, explained as follows:
There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may lawfully
be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands
of the public enemy; and also where a military officer, charged with a
particular duty, may impress private property into the public service or take
it for public use. Unquestionably, in such cases, the government is bound to
make full compensation to the owner; but the officer is not a trespasser. 210
But the law does not authorize a taking, Chief Justice Taney continued, merely “to
insure the success of any enterprise against a public enemy which the commanding
officer may deem it advisable to undertake.”211 Thus, where the official takes property
“not to defend his position, nor to place his troops in a safer one, nor to anticipate the
attack of an approaching enemy, but to insure the success of a distant and hazardous
expedition,” he exceeds his authority and faces liability.212
Following Mitchell, in the 1877 case of Bates v. Clark,213 the Court confronted
whether an army captain should face liability for seizing a business’s liquor without
authority to do so.214 Although the captain had authority to seize liquor in “Indian
country, within the meaning of the act of 1834 and the amendment of 1864,” 215 the
captain’s seizure did not occur in that location. In an opinion authored by Justice
Miller, the Court in Mitchell held that the captain was liable for damages because he
was “utterly without any authority . . . and [his] honest belief . . . is no defence.” 216
Finally, in the 1883 case of Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Railroad Co.,217 the
Court succinctly summarized the tradition of immunity by explaining that an official
“sued in tort for some act injurious to another in regard to person or property, to which
206

Id. at 335–37.

207

Id. at 337.

208

54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).

209

Id. at 135.

210

Id. at 134.

211

Id. at 135.

212

Id.

213

95 U.S. 204 (1877).

214

Id. at 204–05.

215

Id.

216

Id. at 209.

217

109 U.S. 446 (1883).
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his defense is that he has acted under the orders of the government . . . must show that
his authority was sufficient in law to protect him.”218
In short, the tradition of immunity inquiry shows that an official’s entitlement to
immunity depends on whether the official was acting within the scope of his authority
at the time in question.219 As Judge Learned Hand summarized:
The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the
immunity that the official’s act must have been within the scope of his
powers; and it can be argued that official powers, since they exist only for
the public good, never cover occasions where the public good is not their
aim, and hence that to exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to overstep
its bounds. A moment’s reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the
meaning of the limitation without defeating the whole doctrine. What is
meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his power cannot be
more than that the occasion must be such as would have justified the act, if
he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was
vested in him.220
Based on the above, under the tradition, history, and purpose analysis, the tradition
of immunity inquiry demonstrates official immunity should be accorded only to
officials acting within the scope of their authority.
2. History of § 1983
Even if the tradition of immunity suggests that an official should be accorded
immunity, the Court has explained that immunity will not be granted to the official if
§ 1983’s “history . . . counsel[s] against recognizing the same immunity.” 221 Section
1983 traces its origins to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (the KKK Act). The fortysecond Congress passed the KKK Act during the Reconstruction Era after the Civil
War due to concerns that, “by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might
be denied by the state agencies.”222 In relevant part, the KKK Act, which is
substantively similar to the present language of § 1983, provided as follows:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage

218

Id. at 452 (emphasis added).

219 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489–91 (1978) (discussing common law cases
limiting official immunity to officials acting with authority).
220

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (emphases added). See also Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572 (1959) (quoting Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581).
221 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164
(1992).
222

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
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of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in,
any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 223
Congress employed near absolute terms when enacting the KKK Act, intending to
provide a remedial scheme to vindicate constitutional violations. As Senator Allen
Thurman observed, albeit in opposition to the KKK Act, “there is no limitation
whatsoever upon the terms that are employed . . . they are as comprehensive as can be
used.”224 And the author and sponsor of the KKK Act, Representative Samuel
Shellabarger, described the KKK Act as follows:
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and
human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such
statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be most strange
and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of interpretation. As
has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United
States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the
largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in
construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect
and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people. 225
At face value, § 1983’s plain language and legislative history do not appear to
support any variety of official immunity.226 Nevertheless, because § 1983’s plain
language and legislative history do not address official immunity, the Court has
“infer[red] from legislative silence that Congress did not intend to abrogate such
immunities when it imposed liability for actions taken under color of state law.” 227 By
parity of reasoning, “[t]he legislative record similarly gives no indication that
Congress meant to enlarge common law immunities to include officials acting outside
the scope of their authority.”228
Section 1983’s plain terms and legislative underpinnings—based on what
Congress made explicit and left implicit—evince Congress’s intent to create an
expansive remedial scheme while simultaneously preserving official immunity as it
existed under the common law. Thus, under the tradition, history, and purpose
223 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2019)).
224 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 n.45 (1978) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 217 (1871)).
225

Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., App. 68 (1871)).
226 See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986) (observing that § 1983 “on its face
admits of no immunities”); Hon. Lynn Adelman, The Erosion of Civil Rights and What to Do
About It, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2018) (“Nothing in the text of the statute and nothing in the
statute’s legislative history supports the qualified immunity doctrine.”); Andrew M. Siegel, The
Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist
Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1134 (2006) (noting “the absence of any text or
direct legislative history supporting judicial extrapolation of substantial immunities from suit
under § 1983”).
227

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992).

228

In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 592 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better
Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
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analysis, the history of § 1983 counsels against recognizing official immunity if doing
so restricts the remedial scheme of § 1983 and fails to preserve official immunity as it
existed under the common law.
3. Purpose of § 1983
Regardless of the tradition of immunity and history of § 1983, the Court has
explained that immunity will not be granted to an official if § 1983’s purpose
“nonetheless counsel[s] against recognizing the same immunity[.]”229 Section 1983
serves “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive
individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such
deterrence fails.”230 Put another way, § 1983 operates to “compensate persons injured
by deprivation of federal rights and prevent[] abuses of power by those acting under
color of state law.”231
While § 1983 is decidedly remedial, the remedial scheme of § 1983 must be
balanced against the “the special policy concerns involved in suing government
officials.”232 These concerns are: (1) most importantly, “avoid[ing] ‘unwarranted
timidity’ in performance of public duties”; 233 (2) “ensuring that talented candidates
are not deterred from public service”;234 and (3) “preventing the harmful distractions
from carrying out the work of government that can often accompany damages
suits.”235 These policies plainly envision ensuring the smooth operation of effective
government. Indeed, these policy concerns underlie the decision in Harlow.236 Guided
by these policy concerns, the Court in Harlow explained that, requiring officials to
defend lawsuits is attended by the governmental and social costs of the “expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, . . . the
deterrence of able citizens from accepting of public office,”237 and “the danger that the
fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible . . . , in the discharge of their duties.’”238 Nevertheless, while the holding
in Harlow is intended to afford wide latitude to officials by immunizing “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” 239 the Court in Harlow
emphasized that its holding “provide[s] no license to lawless conduct.”240 Harlow thus
defined qualified immunity as an objective standard so as to balance “compensating
229

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164.

230

Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161.

231

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591 (1978).

232

Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167. See also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404 (1997).

233

Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408–09).

234

Id. at 389–90.

235

Id. at 390.

236

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–19 (1982).

237

Id. at 814.

238

Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).

239

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

240

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
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those who have been injured by official conduct and protecting government’s ability
to perform its traditional functions.”241 In light of these principles, the purpose of §
1983 counsels against recognizing official immunity if doing so fails to properly
balance the remedial scheme of § 1983 against the special policy concerns at stake
when government officials are sued.
B. Tradition, History, and Purpose Analysis Applied
Having set forth the governing principles relevant to the tradition of immunity, the
history of § 1983, and the purpose of § 1983, the analysis now turns to apply those
principles to the Authority Irrelevant Approach, the Specific Acts Approach, and the
Clear Scope Approach.
1. Authority Irrelevant Approach
Under the Authority Irrelevant Approach, the official need not demonstrate he
acted with authority under state law. 242 The Authority Irrelevant Approach does not
satisfy the tradition, history, and purpose analysis because it grants qualified immunity
to officials even if they lacked authority, expands qualified immunity from its common
law underpinnings, and fails to give proper weight to the remedial scheme of § 1983.
Dean is illustrative.
As applied in Dean, the Authority Irrelevant Approach accorded qualified
immunity to Director Dean without inquiring of his authority. 243 Granted, the Tenth
Circuit in Dean did reason that Director Dean exercised a degree of discretion
sufficient to assert qualified immunity.244 Dean applied “a federal standard to
determine whether Director Dean’s obligations were sufficiently discretionary” and
concluded that Director Dean exercised “a substantial measure of discretion” in
deciding how to implement the Wage Act.245 But the official’s discretion is distinct
from the official’s authority.246 Even if Director Dean had discretion in deciding how
to implement the Wage Act, the question of how to implement the Wage Act is
separate from whether the Wage Act would be implemented at all.247 Importantly, the
plaintiffs in Dean did not complain of how Director Dean implemented the Wage Act.
They complained instead of Director Dean’s failure to implement the Wage Act, thus
implicating whether the Wage Act would be implemented, which, in turn, implicates

241

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).

242

See supra Part III.A.

243

See supra Part III.A.

244

Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Cummings v. Bussey, No. 18-1357, 2019 WL 4921308 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
245

Id. at 1242.

Harlow clearly limited the controlling doctrine of qualified immunity to “discretionary
functions.” See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
246

247 See N.M. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Dean, 353 P.3d 1212, 1217 (N.M. 2015)
(“[A]ny discretion conferred upon the Director is limited to the Director determining which
CBA will be used to set the rates, not whether a CBA will be used.”).
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Director Dean’s authority to decline to implement the Wage Act. 248 Dean readily
acknowledged that “there was no confusion” regarding Director Dean’s obligation to
determine and publish the rates required under the Wage Act.249 And, in resolving the
mandamus petition against Director Dean, New Mexico’s Supreme Court similarly
made clear that Director Dean did not have authority to decline to implement the Wage
Act.250 Even so, Dean did not inquire of Director Dean’s authority.
By granting qualified immunity to officials regardless of whether they lacked
authority, the Authority Irrelevant Approach undermines the tradition of immunity.
Further, both the history and purpose of § 1983 counsel against the Authority
Irrelevant Approach because it expands qualified immunity from its common law
underpinnings and, in doing so, fails to give proper weight to the remedial scheme of
§ 1983. Hence, the Authority Irrelevant Approach does not satisfy the tradition,
history, and purpose analysis.
2. Specific Acts Approach
Under the Specific Acts Approach, the official must point to narrowly-tailored
state law that affirmatively authorizes his discrete acts, and doubts are likely to be
resolved against the official.251 Applying the tradition, history, and purpose analysis
to the Specific Acts Approach shows that the purpose of § 1983 counsels against the
Specific Acts Approach for two primary reasons.
First, the Specific Acts Approach risks fostering unwarranted timidity on the part
of officials, which is the most important policy concern implicated by suits against
officials.252 Harlow instructs that “a reasonably competent official” is expected to
“know the law governing his conduct.”253 Where that law is not clearly established,
“the public interest may be better served by action taken ‘with independence and
without fear of consequences.’”254 Balancing the need to remedy constitutional
violations against the need to encourage the vigorous exercise of official authority
yields the cornerstone principle that officials should be immune from suits for money
damages so long as they are not “plainly incompetent” and do not “knowingly violate
the law.”255 Yet, before acting under the Specific Acts Approach, the official must
both consider the established law governing his conduct and also anticipate whether
248 See Dean, 913 F.3d at 1241 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs contended that Director
Dean “violated Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due-process rights by failing to determine
prevailing rates for wages and fringe benefits in contravention of the [Wage Act]”).
249

Id. at 1243 n.4.

250

See N.M. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 353 P.3d at 1218 (explaining that Director
Dean’s “delay in setting new rates and his failure to comply with the [Wage] Act is inexcusable”
because Director Dean’s obligation to comply with the Wage Act was a “mandatory,
nondiscretionary duty”); see also supra note 104 (setting forth the standard for mandamus under
New Mexico law).
251

See supra Part III.B.

252

Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 390 (2012) (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S.
399, 408–09 (1997)).
253

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).

254

Id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).

255

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 349–50 (1986).
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his discrete acts may implicate any ancillary laws.256 And the applicability of these
ancillary laws may not be readily ascertainable.257
For example, in Davenport, established Alabama law designated Warden
Davenport as the legal custodian of inmates and delegated to him authority to make
decisions related to inmates’ medical care.258 Under those established principles,
Warden Davenport acted in response to the crisis that occurred when Cummings was
stabbed.259 The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless concluded that Warden Davenport had
exceeded his authority under Alabama law because ANDA, as interpreted under the
expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation, did not affirmatively authorize his
discrete acts.260 Requiring officials to both consider the established law governing
their duties and also anticipate whether their discrete acts may implicate unsettled
ancillary laws—like ANDA in Davenport—effectively resolves doubts against the
official and serves to discourage officials from swiftly making difficult yet critical
decisions. The result is to risk fostering unwarranted timidity on the part of officials.
Second, the purpose of § 1983 further counsels against the Specific Acts Approach
because it saddles officials with an exacting burden when proving up their authority
in litigation. As noted, balancing the remedial scope of § 1983 against the concerns at
stake in suits against officials evinces the important policy of minimizing the burdens
of litigation on officials who are sued.261 The Specific Acts Approach diminishes the
importance of this policy by requiring the official to go beyond the established law
governing his duties as a whole and to instead identify state law that affirmatively
authorizes his discrete acts when proving up his authority.262 The Specific Acts
Approach therefore allocates an exacting burden to the official. Indeed, whether the
official satisfies his burden may require resolution of novel questions of state law, and
Davenport suggests that doubts are likely to be resolved against the official.263 Given
this exacting burden, the purpose of § 1983 further counsels against the Specific Acts
Approach.
To be sure, the Specific Acts Approach comports with the tradition of immunity,
and the history of § 1983 does not counsel against the Specific Acts Approach. As
shown, the Specific Acts Approach limits qualified immunity to officials who can
demonstrate they acted with authority as a threshold matter. 264 The Specific Acts
Approach thus aligns with the tradition of immunity while giving effect to the remedial
scheme of § 1983 and preserving official immunity as it existed under the common
256

See supra Part III.B.

257

See supra Part III.B.

258 Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 941 (11th Cir. 2018) (first quoting In re
Rogers, 82 So. 785, 785 (Ala. 1919); and then quoting Edwards v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 81 F.
Supp. 2d 1242, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2000)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019).
259

Id.

260

Id. at 942.

261

See supra Part IV.A.3.

262

See supra Part III.B.

263

See Davenport, 906 F.3d at 942 (applying expressio unius to ANDA to conclude that
Warden Davenport acted outside the scope of his authority); see also supra Part III.B.
264

See supra Part III.B.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

29

30

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

law. Even so, the purpose of § 1983 counsels against the Specific Acts Approach for
the reasons stated.
Because the purpose of § 1983 counsels against the Specific Acts Approach, the
Specific Acts Approach fails to satisfy the tradition, history, and purpose analysis. 265
3. Clear Scope Approach
By contrast, the Clear Scope Approach satisfies the tradition, history, and purpose
analysis. For one, the Clear Scope Approach aligns with the tradition of immunity
because it limits qualified immunity to officials who can demonstrate they acted within
the scope of their authority and, more specifically, within the clearly established scope
of their authority under state law.266 The Clear Scope Approach also aligns with the
history of § 1983. In re Allen shows that the Clear Scope Approach requires the official
to demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that he acted with sufficient authority under state
law; otherwise, qualified immunity is inapplicable.267 The Clear Scope Approach’s
threshold burden gives effect to the remedial scheme of § 1983 while preserving
official immunity as it existed under the common law, thereby aligning with the
history of § 1983.
Moreover, the Clear Scope Approach aligns with the purpose of § 1983 because it
appropriately balances the remedial scheme of § 1983 against the special policy
concerns at stake when government officials are sued. While the Clear Scope
Approach’s threshold burden prioritizes the remedial scheme of § 1983, the nature of
the Clear Scope Approach’s threshold burden gives proper weight to the special policy
concerns implicated by suits against officials. Unlike the Specific Acts Approach, the
Clear Scope Approach does not allocate an exacting burden to the official. Instead, the
Clear Scope Approach reasonably requires the official to demonstrate that “the act
complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related
to,”268 the official’s scope of authority. Deference is afforded to the official, for “an
official’s conduct falls within his authority unless a reasonable official in the
defendant’s position would have known that the conduct was clearly established to be
beyond the scope of that authority.”269 The official exceeds his “authority only if the
injury occurred during the performance of an act clearly established to be outside of
the limits of that authority.”270 Given this threshold inquiry and the attendant deference
afforded to the official, the Clear Scope Approach avoids unwarranted timidity on the

265 By reasoning that the Specific Acts Approach as applied in Davenport does not satisfy the
tradition, history, and purpose analysis, the Author does not intend to express any opinion on
Warden Davenport’s conduct. Instead, it is the Author’s opinion that a different legal test should
have governed whether Warden Davenport acted with authority, and, if Warden Davenport were
to have satisfied that test, the burden should have then shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate
Warden Davenport violated a constitutional right that was clearly established.
266

See supra Part III.C.

267

See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 590–98 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v.
Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
268

Id. at 594.

269

Id.

270

Id.
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part of officials, ensures that qualified candidates are not deterred from public service,
and minimizes the burdens placed on officials subjected to litigation.271
As applied in In re Allen, Attorney General McGraw failed to demonstrate he acted
within the scope of his clearly established authority by forming a “government agency
corporation” under the auspices of public office.272 The Fourth Circuit in In re Allen
emphasized that Attorney General McGraw, while on West Virginia’s Supreme Court,
had authored the key decision controlling his authority as attorney general, and
Attorney General McGraw’s conduct went beyond what that decision prescribed.273
In re Allen further emphasized that West Virginia law did not recognize a so-called
“government agency corporation.”274 Based on these facts, no reasonable official in
Attorney General McGraw’s position would have believed his conduct was authorized
under state law.275
As such, in In re Allen, the Clear Scope Approach balanced the remedial scheme
of § 1983 against the special policy concerns at stake, ascribed prevailing weight to
the remedial scheme of § 1983, and ultimately denied qualified immunity.276 While
the Clear Scope Approach’s threshold burden is not exacting, In re Allen demonstrates
that it properly balances the remedial scheme of § 1983 against the special policy
concerns at stake. Accordingly, the Clear Scope Approach satisfies the tradition,
history, and purpose analysis.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The issue of whether qualified immunity should be accorded to an official acting
outside the scope of his authority under state law is currently surrounded by three
analytical approaches: the Authority Irrelevant Approach, the Specific Acts Approach,
and the Clear Scope Approach. This Article recommends that the Clear Scope
Approach be employed under the following analytical framework:
First. The official must raise qualified immunity.277
Second. The official must establish his authority under state law. 278 The
relevant contours of the official’s authority are determined by established
state law that directly and unambiguously governs the official’s duties,
including state constitutions, statutes, caselaw, and administrative rules.279

271

See supra Part III.A.3.

272

In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 595–98.

273

Id. at 595–96.

274

Id. at 597 n.5. See also supra note 192.

275

Id. at 598.

276

Id.

See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 152 (“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that
the defendant has the burden of pleading.”).
277

278 In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 594–95 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better
Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
279

Id. at 595.
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Where there is a conflict between sources of authority, ordinary principles of
hierarchy control.280
Third. The official must demonstrate that he acted within the clearly
established scope of his authority.281 The standard is “whether the act
complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably
related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties.” 282
Deference is afforded to the official, and the “official’s conduct falls within
his authority unless a reasonable official in the [official’s] position would
have known that the conduct was clearly established to be beyond the scope
of that authority.”283
Fourth. If the official satisfies his burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly
established at the relevant time.284
Not only does the Clear Scope Approach satisfy the tradition, history, and purpose
analysis, as demonstrated above,285 but it presents a workable test. The above
discussion of Harlow and Pearson evinces that efficient, workable rules are germane
to properly effecting the doctrine of qualified immunity. 286 In Harlow, the Court
jettisoned the subjective good faith inquiry because, in large part, it was difficult to
apply and inefficient.287 And in Pearson, the Court overruled the “rigid order of
battle”288 analysis so as to afford lower courts discretion “to determine the order of
[qualified immunity] decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient
disposition of each case.”289 In keeping with both Harlow and Pearson, the Clear
Scope Approach supplies workable principles that efficiently resolve whether an
official may successfully assert qualified immunity.
This recommendation should not be taken to suggest that merely violating state
law is determinative of qualified immunity. After all, the Court has clearly rejected
the contention that an “official’s violation of a clear statute or regulation, although not
itself the basis of suit, should deprive the official of qualified immunity from damages
for violation of other statutory or constitutional provisions.” 290 Drawing a distinction

280

See, e.g., NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 36:2 (7th ed. 2018) (discussing the hierarchy of different sources of law).
281

In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 594.

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

See id.; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).

285

See supra Part IV.B.3.

286

See supra Part II.

287

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816–17 (1982).

288

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234.

289

Id. at 242.

290 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193 (1984). As Davis further instructed, “[n]either federal
nor state officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or
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between the question of authority and a violation of state law is important, for if a
violation of state law determined authority, “any illegal action would, by definition,
fall outside the scope of an official’s authority.”291 The Clear Scope Approach soundly
makes this distinction. Specifically, under the Clear Scope Approach:
[T]he issue is neither whether the official properly exercised his discretionary
duties, nor whether he violated the law. . . . To equate the question of whether
the defendants acted lawfully with the question of whether they acted within
the scope of their discretion is untenable. Instead, a court must ask whether
the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or
reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary
duties.292
As applied to Dean, the inquiry is not whether Director Dean exceeded his
authority by denying the plaintiffs the wages and benefits to which they were entitled.
The proper inquiry under Dean is instead whether Director Dean’s conduct of failing
to determine and publish the rates of minimum wages and fringe benefits, if done for
a proper purpose, was clearly established to be beyond the scope of his authority under
New Mexico law.293 The Tenth Circuit in Dean did not undertake this inquiry. Under
the Clear Scope Approach, this inquiry would very likely be resolved against Director
Dean, given that Dean arose after New Mexico’s Supreme Court had issued a writ of
mandamus to order Director Dean to determine and publish the rates of minimum
wages and fringe benefits—clear, statutorily-mandated duties of which Director Dean
was indisputably aware.294 Even so, the Tenth Circuit granted qualified immunity to
Director Dean without undertaking this inquiry.
And, as to Davenport, the inquiry is not whether Warden Davenport exceeded his
authority by interfering with Cummings’s end-of-life medical care with deliberate
indifference. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether Warden Davenport’s conduct of
entering a do-not-resuscitate order and deciding to remove Cummings from artificial
life support, if done for a proper purpose, was clearly established to be beyond the
scope of his authority under Alabama law. 295 The Eleventh Circuit in Davenport did
not undertake this inquiry. Under the Clear Scope Approach, this inquiry would likely
be resolved in favor of Warden Davenport in light of established Alabama law
designating Warden Davenport as the legal custodian of inmates and delegating to him
authority to make decisions related to inmates’ medical care.296 The Eleventh Circuit,
regulation—of federal or of state law—unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for
the cause of action sued upon.” Id. at 194 n.12.
291 In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 594 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better
Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
292

Id.

293 See Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Cummings v. Bussey, No. 18-1357, 2019 WL 4921308 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
294

Id. at 1243 n.4; see also supra Part III.A.

295 See Estate of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 941 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019).
296

Id. at 941 (first quoting Ex parte Rogers, 82 So. 785, 785 (Ala. Ct. App. 1919); then quoting
Edwards v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2000)).
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nevertheless, denied qualified immunity to Warden Davenport after interpreting
ANDA, the applicability of which was not readily ascertainable. 297
Finally, as to In re Allen, the inquiry is “not whether [Attorney General McGraw]
exceeded the scope of his authority by forming this corporation in retaliation for
speech critical of him.” 298 Instead, the In re Allen inquiry is whether Attorney General
McGraw’s conduct of “forming his own ‘government agency’ corporation under the
auspices of the Attorney General’s Office,” if done for a proper purpose, was clearly
established to be beyond the scope of his authority under West Virginia law. 299 As the
Fourth Circuit in In re Allen correctly concluded, this inquiry must be resolved against
Attorney General McGraw based on established West Virginia caselaw Attorney
General McGraw had personally authored while on West Virginia’s Supreme Court.300
Thus, by drawing a distinction between the question of an official’s authority and a
violation of state law, the Clear Scope Approach ensures that a violation of state law
does not, by itself, deprive the official of qualified immunity.
Nor should this recommendation be understood to jeopardize principles of judicial
federalism by compelling federal courts to decide novel questions of state law when
determining the scope of an official’s authority.301 The gravamen of the Clear Scope
Approach focuses on the “clearly established” scope of the official’s authority.302
Given that the scope of authority must be clearly established and that only conduct
exceeding the outer limits of the official’s clearly established authority is dispositive,
federal courts will not be tasked with deciding novel issues of state law under the Clear
Scope Approach.
Based on the above, the Clear Scope Approach should be employed to limit
qualified immunity to officials acting within the clearly established scope of their
authority under state law at the time in question.
VI. CONCLUSION
Equilibrium must be brought to qualified immunity. Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, has written that qualified immunity has become an “absolute shield”
that benefits only officials.303 And Justice Thomas has written that qualified immunity
no longer comports with its common law origins, calling for the Supreme Court to

297

Id. at 942; see also supra Part III.B & note 152.

298 In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 595 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better
Gov’t Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
299

Id.

300 Id. at 595–96 (citing Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1982), overruled by
Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 2013)); see also supra Part III.C.
301

See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1524 (1997) (“The only sure way to
eliminate the risk of inequitable administration is for federal courts to refrain from adopting
novel rules of state law.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 1.5, at 32–37 (7th ed.
2016) (discussing the relationship between federal and state courts).
302

See In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 593.

303

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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“reconsider [the] qualified immunity doctrine.”304 Many scholars have similarly
criticized the current state of qualified immunity,305 some contending it should be
overruled.306 And, uncertainty in the doctrine has produced a circuit split over whether
an official’s scope of authority is relevant. Even though the Court has “never suggested
that . . . any . . . official[] has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action
taken in an official capacity[,]”307 the federal courts of appeal are nonetheless split on
whether qualified immunity may be granted to officials who exceed the scope of their
authority under state law.
One way to bring equilibrium to qualified immunity—while leaving the doctrine
in place—is to adopt the Clear Scope Approach. Doing so would appropriately limit
qualified immunity to officials who can demonstrate they acted within the clearly
established scope of their authority under state law at the time in question, thereby
resolving the current circuit split. Not only does the Clear Scope Approach present a
workable test, but it aligns with the tradition of immunity, the history of § 1983, and
the purpose of § 1983.

304 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
305 E.g., Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a
Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 379 (2018) (contending that the doctrine of
qualified immunity should be overhauled so that the availability of qualified immunity
“depend[s] on an assessment of costs and benefits, which vary depending on context”).
306 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1798 (contending that qualified immunity should be
overruled and noting that “[t]he Court dedicates an outsized portion of its docket to reviewing—
and virtually always reversing—denials of qualified immunity in the lower courts”).
307

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997).
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